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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY IN THE RISE OF BOKO
HARAM
by
Samuel Kayode Atewologun
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor Carlos Grenier, Major Professor
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the roles of Islamic identity in the rise and
perseverance of Boko Haram in the northeastern part of Nigeria. This study’s significance
is to contribute to the continued research and understanding of Boko Haram as an Islamic
identity movement based on the unique political history of northern Nigeria, one drawing
on the grievance of Muslim powerlessness in the postcolonial African state. Interpretations
for the rise of movements commonly identified with militant extremism in the Islamic
World tend to rely on materialist explanations, or attribute them to brainwashing. A
broader approach explores political possibilities, socializing structures, and the most recent
experiences to counter an over-reliance on economic interpretations. If Islamic extremism
is to be appreciated entirely and eventually overcome, it is argued that it must be regarded
as a multi-faceted phenomenon triggered by multiple economic, political, social, cultural,
and psychological factors.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study
Northern Nigeria covers about 469,000 square km, which is 51 percent of Nigeria’s
landmass. It is inhabited by about 53 million people, accounting for about 38 percent of
Nigeria’s total population, including numerous ethnic groups and religious communities
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2006). The region is located mainly in the Sahelian belt
south of the Sahara Desert, mostly arid with a low population density of 113 inhabitants
per square km (International Crisis Group, 2010). In this wide and fertile region, many
related states, commonly known as the Hausa states, were established in the late Middle
Ages. The Hausas, who partly came from migrations and partially formed in-situ, became
an identifiable (and self-identifying) group in roughly the twelfth century (Jemkur, 1992).
Many Hausas trace their descent from the legendary Bayajidda, reputedly a refugee
prince from Baghdad (Osae & Nwabara, 1974). Bayajidda seven legitimate sons founded
seven states that bore their names: Biram, Daura, Katsina, Zaria, Kano, Rano and Gobir,
collectively known as the Hausa Bakwai (Bokwoi) or pure Hausa states. Each of these
members of the Hausa family was allotted a task. Gobir, the youngest, was appointed warleader; Daura and Katsina were chiefs of trade; Kano and Rano were ‘chiefs of indigo,’
responsible for industry; and Zaria was the chief of slaves (Osae & Nwabara, 1974).
Furthermore, legend states that Bayajidda also had seven illegitimate sons by a slave girl
named Gwari. These sons founded Zamfara, Kebbi, Gwari, Yauri, Yoruba, and Kwararafa,
collectively known as the Hausa Banza or impure Hausa states. According to Bayajidda
legend, the Hausa people immigrated from the east and north-east to found Hausa land, a
1

place populated by peoples long organized in settled village communities and skilled in
using iron (Osae & Nwabara, 1974).
By the thirteenth century, the Hausa states had gained control over much of the
region, incorporating some smaller groups into multi-ethnic Hausa-speaking polities
(Falola & Heaton, 2008). Initially surrounded by the Bornu Empire to the east and the
Songhai Empire to the west, it was not until the seventeenth century that the Hausa Empire
flourished by gaining control of significant trans-Saharan trade in salt, gold, and slaves.
The Fulani, a large neighboring group, began to influence the Hausa. Through the Mali and
Songhai empires, the Fulani migrated from present-day Senegal to Hausa land in the
thirteenth century and Borno in the fifteenth century. Though mostly nomadic herdsmen,
the scholars among them found appointments in Hausa royal houses, as advisers, scribes,
judges and tax collectors, and gradually gained great influence among Hausa nobles.
Meanwhile, the Kanuri people, which originated from the Kanem Empire that emerged by
the ninth century, were forced to move westward across Lake Chad, subduing local
communities to establish the Borno Kingdom (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Beyond migrations
and early settlements, initial interactions among the people were also shaped by wars,
slavery, commerce, and the spread of Islam. Many of these states waged wars to expand
territorial claims and acquire slaves for working feudal plantations or export to North
Africa (International Crisis Group, 2010).
In addition to the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri, there are also about 160 smaller groups
in the area (Falola & Heaton, 2008). These communities can also be found in other West
African nations such as Chad, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. Neither the Hausa nor the Fulani
are a rigid lineage group – one can become Hausa by adoption or conversion to Islam.
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However, in doing so one enters at the bottom rung of a highly stratified society (Falola &
Heaton, 2008). The boundary between Hausa and Fulani is also complex. The Fulani are
sometimes grouped with the Hausa as a single Hausa-Fulani cultural group. However,
Hausa and Fulani are distinguishable in terms of names and languages and consider
themselves distinct. While nearly all Fulani in the region speak Hausa, the region’s lingua
franca, not all Hausa speaks Fulani.
Northern Nigeria has been profoundly influenced by religion. The Hausa people
were originally polytheistic societies, just like the numerous states in pre-colonial Nigeria
before the arrival of Islam and Christianity. Since the medieval period, however, a large
majority of Northern Nigeria’s the people are Muslim. Today there also exists a substantial
Christian minority, both indigenous to the area and the product of migration from the south
of the country (Brenner, 1993; Gandu, 2016; Ologunwa, 2014). The three largest ethnic
groups, Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri are predominantly Muslim, while many of the smaller
groups are Christian or animist. Although, Muslims are the majority in most of the far
northern states, in the middle-belt or north-central states like Kaduna and Plateau, the
population is mixed, with a large number of Christians (International Crisis Group, 2010;
Ologunwa, 2014) in addition to Muslims. Since British colonization in the early 1900s,
these have crystallized into what are commonly referred to as “majority groups” and
minorities”, with further complexity added by the arrival of substantial numbers of mainly
Christian immigrants from the country’s south (International Crisis Group, 2010).
Over the years, northern Nigeria has experienced recurrent violent conflicts,
particularly ethnic/religious violence, mostly between the Muslims and the Christians,
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since the end of the British colonial administration and most especially since the early
1980s (Falola, 1998). These are the product of several complex and inter-locking factors.
From the eleventh and seventeenth centuries, Islam was introduced into northern
Nigeria, firstly through peaceful means by clerics and merchants from North Africa and
across West Africa. The rulers of the Borno Empire were the first to convert in the eleventh
century, and with the coming of Wangarawa traders and scholars from Mali at the end of
the fourteenth century and an increase in trade with the Songhai Empire in the fifteenth,
Hausa kings followed suit (Loimeier, 1997). By the fourteenth century, Muslim scholars
from Mali occupied critical administrative posts in the Hausa city-states (Loimeier, 1997).
The second phase of Islamization started as a revivalist revolution at the dawn of
the nineteenth century when a Fulani preacher, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, led a jihad
initially aimed at purifying Islamic practices in the region and ultimately at installing a new
righteous leadership. With support from the nomadic Fulani and disgruntled Hausa
peasantry, who had all suffered under the despotism and corruption of the Hausa kings, the
jihad overran the then fourteen Hausa states between 1804 and 1808. It replaced their chiefs
with Fulani emirs (International Crisis Group, 2010). The introduction of Islam into
northern Nigeria has greatly influenced their material and nonmaterial culture in terms of
family life, textile, arts, architecture, housing, habitation, occupation, and tradecrafts
(Muhammad, 2014; Zalanga, 2000). Thus, Islam has remained the creed of the people,
which has strengthened their connection with the Muslim World (Gandu, 2016; Ologunwa,
2014).
The next phase was a dramatic one. The colonization of northern Nigeria by Great
Britain brought about tremendous changes in the socio-economic and religious outlook.
4

Colonial administration in this region can be traced to the Royal Charter that the British
crown granted to the Royal Niger Company at Lokoja in 1886 (Adamolekum, 2004). This
charter granted the company the right to dominate the social, political and economic affairs
of the North. The Charter was later withdrawn in 1899 by Frederick Lugard, the British
High Commissioner of the Northern Region (International Crisis Group, 2010), to be
replaced by British state control as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Lokoja was made
the first seat of British administration in Northern Nigeria (Umaru, 2013). In 1903, Sokoto
Caliphate, which was made up of Southern and Northern Emirates and consisted of Bida,
Kontogora, Adamawa for Southern Emirate and Bauchi, Gombe and Zaria for the Northern
Emirates, came under the control by the British (Umaru, 2013). In 1913, Lord Lugard made
Kaduna the capital of the Northern Region, and by 1914, he had amalgamated the Northern
and Southern Protectorates to form a United Nigeria (Harris, 1986).
From the colonial proclamation of 1900 to independence in 1960, the British
controlled Nigeria through indirect rule. This practice, already well tested in other parts of
the empire, involved restructuring traditional local authorities and deposing those
officeholders who resisted in order to fashion a compliant local power base that furthered
British interests (International Crisis Group, 2010). Local rulers were used to controlling
the populace and raise revenue but were supervised by British officials who could veto
their decisions. The British also sought to avoid any direct disruption of the region’s social
structures, including its dominant religion and culture (slave-owning was only finally
abolished in 1936).
Yet, colonial rule introduced significant political, judicial, and cultural changes in
northern Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2010). For instance, it facilitated the Hausa
5

and Fulani elite’s domination, especially in areas that minority groups had hitherto
regarded as their exclusive domains, and sowed the seeds for conflicting claims to political
space, economic rights and societal values (International Crisis Group, 2010). In the final
year of colonial rule, in 1959, the British removed the Sharia content of the legal code on
the grounds that some of its provisions were incompatible with the rights of all citizens in
a religiously plural society (International Crisis Group, 2010). The Northern Region’s
government accepted a compromised code (“the Penal Code”) that established a Sharia
court of appeal with jurisdiction only for Muslim personal law (International Crisis Group,
2010). However, many Muslim leaders perceived this decision as elevating a Christian
legal code over their Islamic code (Aliyu, 2002). Muslims resented this change and resisted
any perceived attempt at opposing their religious practice. These colonial actions marked
the beginning of the post-colonial religious conflict in Northern Nigeria.
The Statement of Problem
Within some segments of postcolonial Nigeria, the legacy of these colonial reforms
is perceived as a triumph of Christian or secular social programs, and as marginalizing
Islamic religious teachings and practices in northern Nigeria (Benjamin, 2005). Murray
(2007) noted that “a driving force behind the rise of various militant Islamist groups in
northern Nigeria over the last few decades has been a growing sense of religious
insecurities.” (p. 605). Many Muslims in northern Nigeria feels that their religion and its
practices are at stake.
Boko Haram, which firmly believes in the application of Islamic laws in Nigeria’s
socio-economic and political systems, has emerged to pursue that course forcefully. The
group perceives the political and socio-economic system in Nigeria as corrupt, and that it
6

corrupts Nigerian Islamic society. Boko Haram, since its emergence, has continuously
demanded the full application of the Islamic way of life in all aspects of society. Their
frequent ambition has been the installation of an ‘Islamic state,’ hence their engagement in
militant extremism to enforce their demands through what they refer to as jihad, or “holy
war” (Isa, 2010). Louis and Osemeke (2017) noted that “since the time of British
imperialist activity in Nigeria, the Hausa Muslims have defied the colonists’ attempt to
westernize their societies in terms of education, lifestyle, systems of governance,
administration as well as religion.”
Boko Haram has engaged in violence through killings, arson, suicide bombing,
destruction of homes and properties, tensions and socio-economic instability (Human
Rights Watch, 2019). Nigeria has experienced over a hundred religious’ conflicts since its
return to civilian administration in 1999. Still, none of these can be compared with the
Boko Haram’s extremism, which has wreaked havoc in northern Nigeria. Thus, Boko
Haram’s extremism has negatively affected Nigeria’s peace, security and stability.
Thesis Statement
This study explores the role of Islamic identity in the rise of Boko Haram in
northern Nigeria. Its basic argument is that Boko Haram as a group is a product of Islamic
extremism that pursues an Islamic identity, with the self-described mandate to enforce the
full tenets of Islamic sharia into the Nigerian state (Gwamna, 2011; Agbiboa, 2013;
Agbiboa, 2014).
Since Islamic identity or the installation of Islamic sharia into Nigeria, is the root
cause of the Boko Haram extremism, religion has become implicated in the prolonged and
incessant conflicts witnessed in northern Nigeria since the early arrival of the millennium.
7

“Religion plays a pivotal role in every society, including the maintenance of social order
and control, and fostering social change, disorder, deviance, social death, and re-birth”
(Vaughham, 2009: 271).
In Nigeria, religion plays a vital and influential role in society. This role of religion
manifested itself as a potent force of the Nigerian state’s political development from pre to
post-independence. Kenny (2006), Kukah (1994), and Suberu (2009) believe that, the
Nigerian state cannot be understood without reference to religion. Militant-extremism, the
Sharia law controversy, the tensions provoked by the Nigerian accession to the
Organization of Islamic countries now Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and, the
ongoing religious crisis that has engulfed Northern Nigeria indicate that religion cannot be
ignored or pushed aside in the socio-political development of Nigeria. Furthermore,
“religion has since become an instrument of political manipulation of the masses to pursue
and subvert state resources by both politicians and non-politicians alike” (Smah, 2008).
This thesis argues that Islamic identity or entrenchment of Islamic sharia, or
religious law, considering its loss of position within Nigerian society since the colonial
period, is the reason for the emergence and continuous agitations by the Boko Haram group
in Northern Nigeria. The study is limited in scope to this “Islamic identity grievance” in
the emergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.
Most recent studies and efforts on the subject matter have been primarily focused
on the socio-economic or material factors responsible for the emergence of the Boko
Haram insurgency in Nigeria, without adequate examination of the role of Islamic identity
grievance. Therefore, the need to adequately address the devastating role of religious
extremism, as demonstrated by Boko Haram in their effort to institutionalize Islamic laws
8

into the socio-economic and political spheres of Nigeria, fosters this intellectual exercise.
That gap in research is what this study seeks to fill.

Methodology
The researcher employed both the primary and secondary methods of data
collection. Primary data was chiefly written data from official gazettes in addition to
personal experience gained during my undergraduate studies in Religious Studies as well
as testimonies of some Christian and Muslim clerics during our earlier interactions prior
to the start of this degree program. Secondary data sources include textbooks, journal
articles, newspapers, magazine publications, and internet materials. These will provide
supplemental support to information obtained from the primary source. The primary
information will be reviewed with the secondary materials to triangulate the research and
reach a logical conclusion on the subject matter of this study.
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Structure of Study
The study is structured into five chapters as follows:

Chapter One: Background of the Study
This chapter provides general background information on Northern Nigeria and the
emergence of Islam into the region.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Frame and Relevant Literature
This chapter provides a theoretical framework and review of works on the emergence of
Islam as a religious entity, its ideology and diffusion, especially into Nigeria.

Chapter Three: Northern Nigeria and the Emergence of Boko Haram
This chapter presents a historical overview of the emergence of Boko Haram militant
extremism in northern Nigeria. Its major concern is on the driving force of Islamic identity
grievance in Boko Haram extremism in Nigeria.

Chapter Four: Nigeria’s Response to Boko Haram
This chapter presents the Nigerian government’s various attempts in addressing the menace
of Boko Haram extremism in northern Nigeria and the challenges encountered.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
This chapter concludes the study. It provides an overview of the preceding chapter’s
concerns and then makes suggestions on future possibilities in tackling Boko Haram group
in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
Several theories have evolved by scholars in the study of religion and militant
extremism. In this work, we apply John Dollard’s “Frustration-Aggression Theory” in
order to understand the roots of extremism.

John Dollard’s Theory of Frustration-Aggression
John Dollard’s frustration-aggression theory attempts to explain the cause of
violence by suggesting, first, that frustration causes aggression. Secondly, if the source of
the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto an innocent target.
A way to imagine this is the case of a man who, disrespected and humiliated at his work
but who cannot respond to this for fear of losing his job, may go home and take his anger
and frustration out on his family. The theory is also used to explain riots and revolution.
Both are perpetrated by more destitute and more deprived sections of society who may
express them bottled-up frustration and anger through violence (Yunus, 2014).
According to Pastore, frustration is the “condition which exists when a goalresponse suffers interference,”, while aggression is defined “as an act whose goal response
is injury to an organism” (Pastore, 1950) However, aggression is not always the response
to frustration. Instead, a substitute response is displayed when the aggressive response is
not effective (Pastore, 1950).
Concerning this study, it is important to note that northern Nigeria is a region
predominantly populated by Muslims, some of whose spiritual interest is the application
of sharia, or Islamic law, in their lives and affairs. The frustration of this aim, since the
12

colonial period, gives rise to groups such as Boko Haram. Thus, the most popular
explanation for the rise of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria is the Islamic identity
grievance, a mandate to ensure the full application of sharia and practice into the Nigerian
socio-economic and political spheres. It is the radical opposition against the removal of
religious law from its place in society that is being perceived by the group as a major threat
to Islam and its mandate. It can thus be argued that frustration about secularization as
adopted in Nigeria is what has led to or aggravated the aggressive actions which Boko
Haram has been exhibiting over the years.

The Concept of Religion
Religion lacks a concise and generally acceptable definition. Scholars have offered
several definitions of the concept of religion based on their different perspectives. For
Durkheim, he defined religion based on a distinction between the “sacred” and the
“profane”, a distinction which he opined “formed the basis for the creation of a collective
conscience about societal norms and values” (Wanser, 2011). The scholar noted that
“religions are never just a matter of belief, and all religions involve regular ceremonial and
ritual activities which reaffirmed groups’ solidarity in times when people are forced to
adjust to major changes in their lives, and providing for them groups to identify with”
(Wanser, 2011). Vaughham (2009) quoted Durkheim as saying that “all small traditional
cultures have every aspect of life permeated by religion, and that (these) religious
ceremonies both create new ideas and categories of thought and reaffirm existing values,
thereby conditioning modes of thinking of individuals in traditional societies.”
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On his part, Bruce (2003) defined religion as “beliefs, actions and institutions that
assume the existence of supernatural entities with powers of judgment and action,” For
Obilor (2002:63) religion is “the whole complexes of attitudes, conviction, and institutions
through which we express our deep fundamental relationship with reality and not excluding
the created order.”
As for the Nigerian case, Awolalu (1976:5) posits that “religion is often seen as the
cause of violence and instability in Nigeria as its northern and southern regions are equally
divided along religious fault lines.” From an Islamic viewpoint, Juergensmeyer (2005:26)
noted that “Islam, the fastest growing religion in the world, is unique as it incorporates
religion and politics and structures the political economy of a nation.” Supporting
Juergensmeyer’s view, Olomojobi (2013:77) states that “Islam as a political religion is
concerned with the struggle for political recognition in the society. The dynamics of Islam
are not uniform to all societies. It could be a struggle against oppression, a struggle for
scarce resources, a struggle for recognition for Islamic symbolism or a struggle against
westernization and modernity.”

Islam and Its Evolution
To understand Boko Haram’s Islamic identity grievance, one must first understand
Islam, its evolution, message and major challenges. The term “Islam” comes from the
Arabic root ‘s-l-m’, meaning peace, purity, submission, and obedience, among other
meanings (Hammudah, 1999). In a religious view, Islam entails submission to the will of
God. Islam has spread across the world, from the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, and
America. “People of diverse cultures and worldviews have accepted Islamic doctrines,
14

values, ethics, morals, laws and customs in their daily religious practice, which has
contributed to their welfare and prosperity” (Akintoye, 2006: 45).
Islam is a universalist religion. From its emergence, the history of Islam shows that.
Its mission, purpose and diffusion have been focused on the
entire human race, a mission to reach the entire world with
the God’s message. Its general aim has been to reach every
corner of the world to bring about changes, to transform the
world’s economic system, politics, religion, and science and
technology with Islamic codes and practices (Hagnavar,
2013: 29).
According to Hammudah (1999: 199), “the decree of God that Muhammad is the
last prophet is based on the accomplishment of Muhammad, on the universality of Islam,
and the applicability of the Quranic teachings to every situation, every age, and every man.”
Thus, “Islam transcends all borders and penetrates far beyond all barriers of color, race,
status of wealth, or prestige like Judaism and Christianity” (Hammudah, 1999: 199).
Therefore, Muslims believe that “Islam is an assurance of the equality of all humans and
brotherhood, freedom and dignity, peace and honor, guidance and salvation” (Nadwi, 1979:
115). Muhammad came to carry the messages of God to mankind. He was assigned, not
forcefully, but with relevant persuasion, convincing arguments, and clarity of message
(Paramole, 2016). His first sets of converts into the new faith were mainly people of lower
status in the society, “who were attracted by the Islamic principles of equality of the human
race, justice and moral uprightness” (Hagnavar, 2013). Thus, “a number of slaves of
Byzantine or Ethiopian (Abyssinian) origin were among the early Muslims. Among these
were women and young persons. Also, a number of Meccan dignitaries through the efforts
of Muhammad’s close friend Abu Bakr, joined the circle of Islam early, and they were all
15

reckoned among the most illustrious companions of the Prophet” (Paramole, 2016). Malik
(1988: 145) noted that “the teachings of the earlier prophets before Muhammad were
limited to a specific group of people, region, and society. Their missions were not
comprehensive and encompassing because they were not fully detailed and did not
encompass all humanity.” Thus, there was a need for a universal prophet; whose mission
and message would encompass the entire human race to proclaim or declare the sovereignty
of God to mankind. And according to Muslims, “this assignment became fulfilled in the
person of Prophet Muhammad, whose mission was to direct all humans to excellence and
unity” (Paramole, 2016). Given this, Yusuf (2006); submitted that,
“the universality and finality of the prophethood of
Muhammad has the special honor of the capacity of unifying
mankind: For the first time, a prophet came whose message
embraced all preceding divine messages. That would be a
most effective means of bringing all humanity together”
(Yusuf, 2006: 169).

Basically, from the perspective of Islam, all humans are related and share a common
origin and original parents. As such, “Islam enjoins all mankind to view diversity in race,
color, and geographical locations as wealth and blessings which should not be used to
endanger their pristine unity that God intended” (Nadwi, 1979). Thus, since its inception,
“Islam has been intended to be a religion of peace as reflected in its two basic doctrines:
the oneness of God and the unity of brotherhood of the human race” (Abdullah, 2014). As
(Hammudah (1999); noted,
The wider value of the universality of humans in Islam is
also reflected in the strictly legal usage of the word. This is
because Islam has a two-fold significance in the legal sense:
a simple profession of faith (a declaration that there is
nothing and no one that deserves to be worshipped except
16

God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God), and a
complete submission to the Divine will which is only
attainable through spiritual perfection (p.7).
Therefore, “anyone who simply accepts Islam is a Muslim; and so is anyone who
completely submits himself/herself to the Divine will and practices all the Divine
commandments, by subduing his/her desires to the will of God” (Olawale & Stephen, 2020:
621). This total submission to God’s divine will then enables the individual to live in peace
and harmony with each other and between them and God. In Islamic ideology, everything
exists, and all events are orchestrated by God himself (Hammudah, 1999).
Again, Muslims also believe that “Islam’s ultimate mission is to ensure that humans
submit to the total will of God and promote mutual peace on earth through the formation
and strengthening of brotherhood among humans and bring about a unity of religious
practice that is devoid of errors” (Paramole, 2016). That is, it is God’s will through Islam
to unite the entire human race into a single body, free from any form of discrimination.
Islam, a body of religion that teaches peace among humans, is concerned with
reaching the entire mankind with teachings that promote equality without discrimination.
Omotosho (2009) posits that, “Islam asserts the equality of all people; its ideas and values
were always couched in the language of humanity with a global audience” (p.10).
According to Islamic doctrine, “all humans came from Adam and Eve, emphasizing the
primordial equality of all. This universal equality of humans as enshrined in Islam’s ethics
and values, is a significant cornerstone upon which globalism is based” (Hamidullah,
1981:4).
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However, some Muslims believe that this unity must be created forcefully by
human beings, through war if necessary. In the words of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, founder
of ISIS,
O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the religion of peace.
Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet (peace be upon
him) was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the
creation. He was ordered with war until Allah is worshipped
alone. He (peace be upon him) said to the polytheists of his
people, ‘I came to you with slaughter.’ He fought both the
Arabs and non-Arabs in all their various colors. He himself
left to fight and took part in dozens of battles. He never for
a day grew tired of war (Quoted by Whiteside, 2016:23).

Since ISIS represents a minority opinion, it would be inaccurate, then, to believe
that Muslims are united in this opinion. On the contrary, according to Hammudah (1999:
200), “Muslims are not a single, homogeneous entity. It is more than a system of theology;
it is a complete civilization.” The scholar noted further that “Islamic laws allow diversity
of opinions among people” (Hammudah, 1999:200). Thus, as with most faiths, Islam has
produced divisions, sects, diverse interpretations and schools of thought in its adherents.
Although Muslims are united in their belief in God, in the Quran, prophet Muhammad, and
the Islamic Five Pillars, “there have been numerous areas or causes of dissensions among
them, especially in areas of religious and political leadership, ideology, interpretations of
Islamic laws and codes, and in the level of their response to westernization” (Hammudah,
1999: 199). A In terms of ideological, political and religious interpretations, “the Muslims
are divided into two sects: the Sunnis (made up of about 85 percent of the world’s Muslims)
and the Shi’is (about 15% of the world’s Muslims)” (Abdullah, 2014). More so, there are
diverse schools of theology, law and ritual, in addition to many mystical Sufi brotherhoods.
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A major area of division and crisis among Muslims is their diverse responses to
modern or western values and practices. Hence, “Muslims have struggled to relate with
modernity as it affects their Islamic traditions, their religious codes which have been
developed since the primitive age” (Olawale & Stephen, 2020). Since most modern
changes and transformations are mostly associated with Western ideas, values, and
institutions, “the responses of the Muslim to such issues of reform and modernization like
democratic values and practices, liberty, freedom of association, lifestyle, opinion, among
others, are occasionally seen to conflict with their Islamic values and practice”
(Hammudah, 1999: 200). Thus, the issue of westernization of the world and its values has
greatly provoked certain sects within Muslims, resulting in various acts of extremism,
militancy and terrorism across the world, as exemplified in Nigeria with the emergence of
the Boko Haram sect.
It has been observed that “the major factors in the modern era of globalization- are
trade, capital, investment, movement of people with their cultures, religion, dissemination
of knowledge and international relations and policies” (Atolagbe, 2018: 83). The increase
and movement of people, goods and services across the world, result from advancement in
transportation routes, telecommunications media’s like the internet, mobile phones, and
satellite television, connecting millions of people in new ways and this have increased the
global spread of Islam. This has allowed Islamic ideologies to diversify even further. As a
result, several Muslim groups, bodies and organizations are easily connected and
efficiently disseminate information, ideas and resources to further their religious interests.
While many such Islamic groups and organizations see no conflict between their religious

19

interests and westernization, others, such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Boko
Haram, have grown into radical movements.
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CHAPTER THREE
NORTHERN NIGERIA AND BOKO HARAM EXTREMISM
The Emergence of Islam in Africa
Scholars within and outside the African continent have written extensively on the
emergence, impact and challenges of Islam in Africa, of which Nigeria is an important part.
Historians have traced Islam’s emergence and presence as a religious entity in Africa to
the seventh century. It was noted that during that time, “the Prophet Muhammad advised a
number of his early followers, who were facing persecution from the pre-Islamic
inhabitants of Mecca, seeking refuge across the Red Sea at the court of Aksum in Zella
under the rule of Al-Najāshī” (Olawale & Stephen, 2020:). According to Muslim belief,
this event is regarded as the first migration (Olawale & Stephen, 2020). Several years later,
after Muhammad’s death (in 632 CE), “some groups of Arabs moved toward Africa and
within a period of two generations, Islam had expanded across the Horn of Africa” (Polk,
2009).
Islam in African continent came from the east and north Africa. From these
directions, “the Islamic faith crossed wide spaces, such as the Indian Ocean and vast desert
sands of the Sahara. The ocean and the desert were thus transformed into excellent
transmitters of religious and cultural influences” (Abbas & Zanjani, 1998). Islamic
missionaries and traders moved from Egypt in three directions, through the Red Sea
towards the eastern coast, up to the Nile Valley to Sudan, and then crossed over the western
desert to the Maghreb (Olawale & Stephen, 2020). From the eleventh century, Arab
nomads began to enhance the spread of Islam and Arabic practices through their movement
from Egypt to Sudan; and across North Africa.
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As early as 780 CE, Islam had been introduced to the east coast (Olawale &
Stephen, 2020). The Islamic religion later became “the religion of the majority of the
Swahili-speaking people between the thirteenth and sixteenth century” (Rahim, 1969: 27).
Islamic practices also spread from the Arabian Peninsula to East Africa, and “for over two
centuries, many male Muslims from Eastern Africa were sent to study in Hadhramaut in
Mecca and Medina” (Rahim, 1969: 27). In the nineteenth century, “a new class of
merchants and landowners with wealth from plantations and trade contributed to the
Islamic religious revival in the East African coast” (Olawale & Stephen, 2020). This set of
elites contributed immensely to the widespread of mosques and Arabic schools, which
further increased Muslims socio-economic opportunities. In places like Mozambique and
Tanzania, the Yaos were the major Muslim group.
Islam spread to West Africa during the same span of time. Some of the major factors
that contributed to the widespread of Islam in Africa were the economic, religious,
political, and educational activities that were already in place, due to the activities of
missionaries, traders, and political elites. Thus, the Islamic faith became widespread mainly
through trading, business activities of merchants, and migration of scholars and the
missionary activities of preachers (Olawale & Stephen, 2020).
Islam had been introduced into Northern Nigeria in the eleventh and seventeenth
centuries by clerics and merchants from North Africa and the Arab world (Loimeier, 1997).
However, the expansive spread of Islam into Northern Nigeria was accelerated in the
nineteenth century by the Islamic revivalist revolutionary movement of Uthman Dan
Fodio, a member of the Fulani ethnic group; with distant roots in Senegal (Brockelmann,
1999; Malcom & Daly, 1988). He did this through jihad (‘struggle’) to ensure true Islamic
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practices in the region and bring about the installation of new righteous leadership
(International Crisis Group, 2010).

The Islamic Identity Grievance
Today, diverse groups with varying religious identities have emerged, creating
diverse conflicts within groups (Aydin, 2006). It is common these days to note that
“discussions on religious extremism as a source of terrorism usually identify Islam as a
major causative factor (Milton-Edwards, 2005; Hoveyda, 1998). And today, various
terrorist groups such as, al-Jihad, Islamic Jihad, Hizb-ut Tahrir, Army of God, Islamic
Liberation Front, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram make daily headlines in
connection with terrorism, situating a link between religion and global terrorism. In view
of this, Aydin (2006) noted that,
When we consider the perpetrators and the violent events
that have led to the deaths of many civilians, such as the
attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the massacre of
tourists in Luxor, Egypt in 1997, the bombings of U.S.
Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the attacks on
New York and Washington, D.C. in September 2001, as well
as bombings in Madrid (2004), Istanbul (2004), and London
(2005), it is possible to rather unavoidably (and all too
easily) establish a connection between the use of terror and
Islam (pp. 7-18).

However, such analyses that focuses mainly on the atrocities of extremists and
generalize them to Islam is erroneous at best. Although, “Islam is sometimes used as a tool
of self-identification and psychological support for extremist religious groups associated
with threats directed at political, societal, economic, and human security at the national,
regional, or global levels” (Aydin, 2006: 10), it is incorrect to think that the current security
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threat facing the world, and particularly Northern Nigeria, is created by the Islamic faith.
Today, “certain radical and extremist groups, imagining identities based on Islam as a
religion, pose serious threats to human security worldwide” (Aydin, 2006: 10). Of such
group is the Boko Haram Islamic extremist sect which claims to radicalize reactions against
the forces of westernization, which the group perceives as a form of neo-colonialism
(Forest, 2012).
Murray (2007: 605) noted that “a driving force behind the rise of various militant
groups in northern Nigeria over the last few decades has been a growing sense of religious
and economic insecurities.” Militant-extremists have continuously demanded the full and
adequate application of sharia, in addition to their economic concerns. And, although they
adopt Western technology, “they are vehemently opposed to Western civilization and
domination; their frequent mandate has been the installation of an Islamic state, hence their
engagement in extremism to enforce their demands through what they refer to as “jihad”
(Isa, 2010: 321). For instance, Boko Haram believes that the Islamic faith is gradually
waning and losing its ideas and influence in Northern Nigeria.
For over a thousand years, the period when Europe was struggling with the
barbarism of the Dark Ages, before the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution, Muslim
scholars were highly regarded for their knowledge in arts, science, and technology (Deblij
& Muller, 1998: 5). However, today, with the West dominating and ordering the cultural,
economic, military, and even the world’s political system, with numerous countries
imitating the West in present time, the position and relevance of the Islamic civilization
has shifted. This has led the religious extremists to raise questions about the causes and
way out of the present world. According to Huntington (1996:109:110), “Muslim extremist
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sects in massive numbers are simultaneously turning toward Islam as a source of identity,
meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope, with the belief that Islam
will offer them the solution.”
These analyses present an anxiety about the sharia and the waning of Muslim
culture as being at the heart of Muslim political movements, and this view seems to be
accepted among the Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. In particular, the trajectory of the
future Boko Haram seems to have been laid out by the secularizing policies of the British
colonial administration following the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate. Louis and Osemeke
(2017) noted that “since the time of British imperialist activity in Nigeria, the Hausa people
have defied the colonists’ attempt to westernize their societies in terms of education,
lifestyle, system of governance, administration as well as religion.” Newman pointed out
that,
After the British colonial government overthrew the Sokoto
caliphate, established control over northern Nigeria in the
beginning of the 20th century, the secular schools imposed on
the region were pejoratively referred to as ‘boko’ by the
Hausa elites. Having seen the secular educational institutions
as lacking divine origin, un-Islamic and corrupt, they
prevented their children from attending the schools. They
only granted their slave (bawa) and servant (baro) access to
the new Western education (Newman, 2013:10).

Although the British colonists retained some of the Islamic laws instituted by the
caliphate, after some time they restricted its application to only civil matters; and also
limited the application of specific punishments and reduced the application of sharia to the
local division of native courts (Ologunwa, 2014: 51-64). Today, many Muslims in northern
Nigeria feel that their children’s spiritual and moral future is insecure due to the secular
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political and socio-economic system in the country, which can be traced to British
administration (Last, 2007).
Furthermore, Ologunwa also noted that, “the British came to northern Nigeria
desirous of identifying and collaborating with a group of rulers representing a cultural and
political entity that they deemed ‘civilized’ and sophisticated enough to be partners in the
colonial project; the Hausa-Caliphate world view and their representatives, the HausaFulani emirs and the Caliphate aristocracy were recruited into this role” (Ologunwa, 2014:
52). Thus, the influence of British colonialists caused a division among the people of
Northern Nigeria, who were once united by Islam. This division saw, on one side,
‘'civilized' elites who were used by the British as agents of colonization, and on the other
side, the commoners, who vehemently resisted Western influence in the region” (Danjibo,
2012). This latter group had developed into different militant extremist sects in the region,
transforming into radicalized group with leaders who at some point or the other engage
them in activities against the state and moderate Muslims in the area.
In fact, these radical sects within the Muslim community oppose moderate Muslims
for their ‘hypocrisies and unholy practices,’ which, according to these sects, do not
represent true Islamic ideology. Besides non-Muslims Boko Haram fighters have directed
their violence against Muslims who oppose its ideology, as evidenced by the killing of
some Islamic clerics by the group (see Table 1 below).
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Table 1: Assassination of Islamic Clerics by Boko Haram
S/N

Period of

Name of Islamic Cleric/Leader

Location of Death/State

Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmud Adam

Kano State

Death/Year
1.

April 2007

(Izala)
2.

October 2010

Sheikh Bashir Mustafa

Maiduguri, Borno State

3.

March 2011

Ustaz Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi

Maiduguri, Borno State

Gomari
4.

May 2011

Sheikh Goni Tijjani

Maiduguri, Borno State

5.

June 2011

Sheikh Ibrahim Birkuti (Wahabbi)

Biu, Borno State

6.

August 2011

Lima Bana

Maiduguri, Borno State

7.

September 2011

Mallam Dala

Maiduguri, Borno State

8.

October 2011

Sheikh Ali Jana’a

Maiduguri, Borno State

9.

February 2012

Mallam Mai Tatabara

Damaturi, Yobe State

10.

February 2012

Modu Goroma (Arabic teacher)

Dmamturi, Yobe State

11.

February 2012

Sheikh Saina Alhaji Ajiya

Konduga, Borno State

12.

March 2012

Mohammed Alhaji Bukar

Maiduguri, Borno State

13.

April 2012

Goni Mustapha

Maiduguri, Borno State

14.

May 2012

Mohammed Alli (Shiite)

Kano State

15.

May 2012

Usman Muhammed

Potiskum, Yobe State

16.

July 2012

Sheikh Ibrahim Majimi

Maiduguri, Borno State

17.

December 2012

Alarama Dan Gobobirawa

Potiskum, Yobe State
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18.

May 2013

Mallam Sheriff

Ngamdu, Yobe State

19.

August 2013

Alhaji Liman Bukar (Chief Imam)

Fune, Yobe State

20.

February 2014

Salafiyyah

Zaria, Kaduna State

Source: Ejodame (2014:24-25)

The above table shows that several Muslim clerics have been killed by Boko Haram
extremists. This indicates that Boko Haram represents a sharp division within the Muslim
community of Northern Nigeria. This must be kept in mind when trying to understand
Islamic identity as the source of their grievance and atrocious activities, evidence have
shown that religious explanation is only an aspect of extremism. Thus, Islam as a religious
movement is not by any means the causative factor or trigger for the Boko Haram
extremism, rather their views represent a specific interpretation of the political role for
Islamic law within the Nigerian state.

The Emergence of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria
Scholars differ on when Boko-Haram started in Nigeria. Still, there is a consensus
that, although it can be traced beyond 2002, that year marked the beginning of their
activities in the country. But before 2002, there have been several predecessors - violent
and non-violent Islamic extremist movements, usually formed around a specific preacher,
who have either risen against the government and religious establishment or tried to
establish small communities governed by strict sharia laws. These have included the
Talakawas in the 1940s and 1950s, made up of Muslim commoners, beggars and
unemployed youths; in the 1970s and 1980s emerged the Yan Tatsine, led by the preacher
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Mohammed Marwa (Alao, Atere & Alao, 2015) who reviled Western education and took
measures to denounce the use of radios, bicycles, and watches (Bumah & Abimbola, 2009;
Danjibo, 2012). The Mai Tatsine group orchestrated numerous riots in the country,
resulting in many deaths and the destruction of valuable properties (Danjibo, 2012).
Therefore, some scholars now perceive the Boko Haram sect as an offshoot of the Mai
Tatsine sect (Johnson, 2011; Alao, Atere & Alao, 2015).
Scholars believe that Boko Haram started in 1995 and was known as “Sahaba”
under the leadership of Alhaji Abubakar Lawan (Liolio, 2013; Ogege, 2013). Later, the
group leader, Lawan, went to study at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia and handed
the group’s leadership over to Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf later reorganized the group in
2002 to what is known today (Liolio, 2013). While in Maiduguri, Yusuf created a religious
compound which consisted of a mosque and an Islamic school. He established a stronghold
in some northern states like Kano, Yobe, Bauchi, Katsina, and Gombe. However, in 2004
the unit was moved to Kanamma, Yobe State, Yusuf’s hometown, close to the NigeriaNiger border, where a radical base is known as “Afghanistan'' was created (Liolio, 2013:
65).
Elkaim (2013) noted that “Boko Haram first received widespread attention when it
launched attacks against police stations and other public buildings late December 2003;
after eighteen members of Boko Haram were killed and the group members fled to a remote
base near the Nigeria-Niger border to regroup.” During this period, the group expanded in
membership as some students, who became motivated by the group’s ideology, left secular
schools for the Islamic schools (Agbiboa, 2013).
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Obviously, from the aforementioned origins of Boko Haram, it is evident that the
group was founded by the late Mallam Muhammed Yusuf; and it was under his leadership
that the group became radicalized and gained national and international recognition and
collaboration, especially with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Abimbola & Adesole,
2012). Since the death of its former leader, Muhammed Yusuf, in 2009 the group has
constituted a considerable security challenge in the country.
Scholars have noted that the inability to implement sharia law in the Northern
region is a significant cause of Boko Haram development. Following this line of argument
is Abimbola (2010), who expressed it in the context of partisan politics and political
patronage. Amibola argued that,
The introduction of Sharia in some parts of Northern Nigeria
beginning from 1999 appear to inspire closeness between the
leader of the group, Yusuf, and the ruling class since their
decision aligned with his plan to promote strict adherence to
Islamic law, but he was disappointed at the type of Sharia
introduced which fell short of his standards, thus putting him
in a situation to reach a conclusion that the ruling elites were
not serious Muslims or that their western education was
hindering or limiting their commitment. (Abimbola,
2010:21).
Abimbola cites Omipidan (2009), who posits that “Yusuf’s fraternization with the
political class possibly informed his willingness to use his group to assist the political elite
in securing political power that would, in turn ,be used to protect and possibly advance his
career. His abandonment by the political class could have hastened his descent to violence
to effect change.”
McConnell (2009) states that “failure to attach the Sharia based laws to social
welfare schemes, the implication of which would mean that the dividends of Sharia are not
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forthcoming; the reality of this is the radicals stepping in to demand fully beneficial Islamic
state” (as cited in Abimbola, 2010). Barna (2014) contended that the implementation of
Sharia law is considered by some as incomplete and lacking in meaning as it is not
effectively dealing with fundamental issues like corruption or poverty. Thus, religion, that
is, Islamic extremism has been the major factor in the various extremist violent activities
particularly, in Northern Nigeria. And the claim for an ‘Islamic state’, strictly administered
through the sharia legal conduct, that is, with total adherence to Islamic law, has been the
prominent bone of contention for Boko Haram.

Boko Haram’s Ideology
Boko Haram believes strongly in the forceful and complete application of Islamic
laws in Nigeria’s socio-economic and political systems. The group see Western education
and the secular system of government in operation in Nigeria (Campbell, 2010) as an
obstacle to this. The group perceives the political and socio-economic system in Nigeria as
a corrupt Islamic society. Its founding leader, Muhammed Yusuf, had noted, “Our land was
an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir land. The current system is
contrary to true Islamic beliefs” (Salkida, 2009).
In 2003, Osama bin Laden urged the Muslims in Nigeria to “incite and mobilize the
Islamic nation…to break from the slavery of those regimes who are slaves to America”
(Campbell, 2010: 53). He characterized Nigeria as one of the “unjust and infidel” regimes
(Campbell, 2010). Boko Haram thus represents a Nigerian-specific case of modern
Islamism. At inception, Boko Haram called itself ‘Nigerian Taliban’, and set up a camp
which it called ‘Afghanistan.’ In one of his messages, the group leader, Yusuf noted,
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“We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying
out jihad (religious war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based
on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never accept
any system of government apart from the one stipulated by
Islam because that is the only way that the Muslims can be
liberated. We do not believe in any system of government,
be it traditional or orthodox except the Islamic system and
that is why we will keep on fighting against democracy,
capitalism, socialism and whatever. We will not allow the
Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have been
enshrined in the Holy Qur’an; we will not allow adulterated
conventional education (Boko) to replace Islamic teachings.
We will not respect the Nigerian government because it is
illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the police
because they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in
the Nigerian judicial system and we will fight anyone who
assists the government in perpetrating illegalities” (Zenn,
et.al, 2013:49-50)

Boko Haram's core motive is encapsulated in this quotation from Mohammed
Yusuf: “We are for jihad, and our jihad is to put an end to democracy, to western education
and western civilization. The jihad is intended to make us (Muslims) return to the original
state of Islam” (Zenn, et.al. 2013:50). Also, Yusuf told the BBC Hausa Radio before his
extra-judicial execution, that “Western education is mixed with issues that run contrary to
our beliefs in Islam; our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to
an infidel land. The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs'' (Agbiboa, 2013:5).
Boko Haram’s leadership holds that jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam. The five
traditional pillars are the profession of faith, prayer, fasting, charity and pilgrimage.
However, jihad is interpreted to be an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn), not a collective
duty (fard kifaya) (Ayoob, 2011:143). These jihad fighters are known as “Mujahideen”
(holy warriors). According to some traditions, those who die fighting jihad are martyrs
whose reward in paradise are “rivers of milk and honey, and beautiful young virgins. Those
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entering paradise eventually are reunited with their families and as martyrs stand in front
of God as innocent as a newborn baby” (Laqueur, 1999:100).

Boko Haram Extremism in Northern Nigeria
Groups like Boko Haram may have existed in various forms in the past, without
constituting much threat to national security. But current realities show that Boko Haram
phenomenon has become a severe security issue, particularly in north-eastern Nigeria. In
2004, “Boko Haram started to attack police stations across the northern states to steal
weapons. As these attacks persisted, they resulted in reprisal attacks by the police through
raids and arrests to recover stolen weapons” (Agbiboa, 2013). In 2009, members of the
insurgent group became furious when Bauchi State’s government refused them from
engaging in public preaching and recruiting new members. The group’s responses became
more violent than before due to perceived police brutality while enforcing a motorbike
helmet law. “The violent reaction by the Boko Haram sect resulted in a five-day
disturbance in four states, where about seven hundred persons were killed with many
houses and properties destroyed” (Pham, 2012:1-8). The disturbances were later controlled
through a combined effort of the police and the military operation of the police and military,
known as ‘Operation Flush.’ “The action resulted in the attack on Muhammed Yusuf’s
house. After a two-day standoff, Yusuf was arrested and later killed in police custody.
Later, the Nigerian police alleged that he was killed while trying to escape from police
custody, but investigations later revealed that it was an extra-judicial killing” (Onuoha,
2012:54-67).
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In just a few years since their emergence, they had grown to become one of the
world’s deadliest terrorist groups (Agbiboa, 2013). Atere and Alao (2015) perceived the
increasing spread of activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria and the destruction of
lives and property as “a growing concern that could not be wished away with the wave of
a hand.” Throughout the second decade of the twenty-first century, Boko Haram has
engaged in well-coordinated simultaneous attacks daily across the northeast. Their reach
extends to the northwest and federal capital territory, Abuja, where they have carried out
the targeted assassination and bank robbery and even take on security forces (Akinbi,
2015). Since 2009, the rate at which violence Boko Haram has carried out violence has
accelerated.
In 2015, the Vanguard Newspaper reported that “444 people were murdered by
Boko Haram in 39 days after President Mohammadu Buhari was inaugurated.” It
(September 21, 2015) also reported that “at least 54 people had died in the previous day
coordinated strikes by Boko Haram with 90 injured, but residents that were caught up in
the explosions said as many as 85 lost their lives.” The paper claimed that the Nigerian
authorities continued to downplay the enormity of the attack. Online cable news media in
Nigeria did a detailed compilation of all Boko Haram attacks that took place in 2015, at
that point the death toll of all Boko Haram attacks in 2015 alone as 4,780.
The worst attack by the group that attracted international outcry was “the abduction
of over 219 students of Government Secondary School Girls who were writing WAEC test
in the town of Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria on the night of April 14, 2014” (Akinbi,
2015) This particular action by the insurgent group shocked the nation. People wondered
how the group was able to mastermind this brazen attack, which took the government of
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Nigeria about two weeks to comment. Another deadly attack by the group was “on
December 25, 2011, at Madalla, Niger State, where St. Theresa’ Catholic Church was
destroyed with a bomb” (Danijibo, 2012). It was noted that, “about 48 persons died in the
attack while over 200 Christians were hospitalized” (Danjibo, 2012). Danjibo (2012) again
reported that, “earlier in January 6, 2011, members of the sect struck in Mubi, Adamawa
State and killed 20 Igbo men and women. At the end of the massacre this deadly group
issued a three-day ultimatum to southerners, mainly Christians, to leave northern Nigeria.”
On June 17, 2012, three churches in Kaduna were set ablaze by bombings, causing
havoc among these communities (Danjibo, 2012). Another blast hit the roof of Christ the
King Catholic Church, Sabon Gari, Zaria in Kaduna State. At almost the same time, another
bomb exploded at the ECWA (Evangelical Church Winning All) church, killing many.
“This irked the Christians to barricade the Kaduna/Abuja road and in the process sort out
Muslim passersby and executed all they could lay their hands on” (Danjibo, 2012).
According to Newswatch, “no fewer than 70 persons died and more than 130
severely wounded in the reprisal attacks that happened in June 19, 2012 in Kaduna State,
Nigeria” (Newswatch Magazine, June 19, 2012). It appeared that the police and the Army
Joint Task Force that was ordered to curtail the killings by Boko Haram could not compete
with Boko Haram as they seemed to have more sophisticated weapons and even appeared
to be more trained in warfare than those sent to drive them from their areas of operation.
(Newswatch, July 2, 2012:12-15).
In fact, “hundreds of people were killed in similar circumstances in Kano as the
city practically became a war zone from the evening of Friday, January 20, 2011, to the
day multiple bomb blast rocked different parts of the metropolis. The government at the
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end of the killings put the figure of those killed at 185, but a source told Newswatch that
more than 200 people were killed” (Newswatch Magazine February 6, 2012: 25). In
another development, in Damaturu and Yobe State, a popular location for Christians known
as ‘New Jerusalem’ where most Christians consider a haven, was targeted by the Boko
Haram sect and bombed on November 4, 2011. “This was one of the deadliest attacks ever
carried out by Boko Haram, the Islamic fundamentalist sect which has become a thorn in
the flesh of the nation. The deadly strike claimed more than 150 lives and rendered
thousands of people homeless” (Newswatch Magazine, November 5, 2011; Danjibo,
2012).
Furthermore, the Islamic insurgent sect destroyed properties such as houses,
vehicles, farmlands, churches, and mosques in these locations. Several communities were
destroyed in the area, including Kuborshosho, Kubi, and Garta (Saturday Sun, October 4,
2014:7). During the attack, “the residence of the former governor of the state was
destroyed. Members of his family narrowly escaped death through the help of neighbors
who assisted in evacuating them during the attack” (Saturday Sun, October 4, 2014: 7). As
of the end of January 2017, the Boko Haram insurgency had internally displaced 1,770,444
persons in Nigeria, 176,555 in Cameroon, 121,391 in Niger, and 90,911 in Chad (UNHCR,
2017).
For most of the north, the prolonged insurgency has significantly affected the
economy. Some foreign investors in the location, such as the Lebanese and Indian
expatriates, have relocated to Abuja and the south, while others have left the country
entirely. Thus, various businesses such as banks, hotels, transport companies,

36

telecommunications, and others, have experienced serious setbacks in their business
operations (Ryan, 2015; De Montclos, 2014).
The high level of insecurity in the country has led to a decline in business
investment and activities, particularly in the north. According to the UNCTAD (United
Nations conference on Trade and Development) Report (as cited in Okereocha, 2012),
“FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) flows to Nigeria fell to
$6.1 billion (N933.3billion) in 2010, a decline of about 29
percent from the $8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) realized in the
2009 fiscal year. Also, statistics obtained from the 2010
annual report by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) showed
that the total foreign capital inflow into the Nigerian
economy in 2010 was $5.99 billion. The record showed that
FDI represented about 78.1 percent drop from $3.31 billion
in 2009” (Okereocha, 2012:47).

The consequence of this is that most manufacturers have reduced their production
volume due to a drop in sales. This has further resulted in reduced earnings by the
manufacturing companies, while increasing production costs, reducing in capacity
utilization, and rising unemployment rate, (Okereocha, 2012). According to Ogege (2013):
“Most manufacturers in Nigeria (MAN) have expressed their
frustration at the state of insecurity in the country. A report
from a survey carried out by the body, shows that in 2009, a
total number of 176 firms became terminally ill and
collapsed in the northern area, comprising the Kano and
Kaduna manufacturing axis. In the southeast area, which is
comprised of Anambra, Enugu, Imo and Abia States, a total
number of 178 companies closed shops during the period.
While in the south-south area, which comprised of Rivers,
Cross River and Akwa Ibom states, 46 companies shut down
operations before December 2009. The survey further
showed that the southwest area, which comprised of Oyo,
Ogun, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, Kogi and Kwara states, lost 225
companies during the year. The report further affirmed that
the Lagos area covering Ikeja, Apapa, Ikorodu and other
industrial divisions in the state, followed closely with 214
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manufacturing firms closing shop before the end of 2009”
(Ogege, 2013:16)
These firms’ major reason for closure is insecurity, destruction of equipment, and
inadequate power supply (Okafor, 2011). If the state of insecurity in the country persists,
most businesses are likely to close or leave. In addition, others may relocate to neighboring
countries, further worsening the economic state in the country.
According to the International Crisis Group (2014), “the Nigerian government
spends $6 billion of its annual budget on security within an economy of approximately half
a trillion dollars. Also, the military is made up of 90,000 active duty, and 25,000 reserve
components, for a country of 180 million people.” This is woefully inadequate considering
the complex security threats and challenges facing the country. It has been argued that the
budget deficits result from of chronic corruption on the part of Nigerian commanders
(International Crisis Group, 2014). This inadequate budgetary allocation to the security
sector at a time of challenging and sophisticated security threats has led many experts to
accuse the Nigerian government of lacking the goodwill to tackle this menace
(International Crisis Group, 2014).
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESPONSE OF THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT TOWARDS
COMBATING BOKO HARAM EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA
Efforts of the Nigerian Government.
The Government of Nigeria has made several efforts to combat terrorism in the
country. From the inception of the crisis, the government had relied heavily on military
force to confront the insurgent groups by deploying thousands of troops to affected areas
in the north (Akande, 2013). In May 2013, the former President of Nigeria, President
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the three worst-hit northern
states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Furthermore, to redress the almajiri (boarding
school) system which provides ready foot soldiers for Boko Haram in some northern states.
Campbell reiterated this when he noted that,
“In 2013, former President Goodluck Jonathan launched a
major offensive against Boko Haram, declaring a state of
emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States; while
national forces claimed some success in pushing militants
out of cities, attacks in rural areas continued with regularity,
and Nigerian troops have been accused of human rights
abuses, including extrajudicial killings” (Campbell,
2014:112).
The Nigerian government went further to deploy a “special trained anti-terrorism
combat squad to the terrorist zones in order to suppress the activities of Boko Haram”
(Okupe, 2015). Again, the government went on to “acquire and develop more
sophisticated, adequate and appropriate military hardware” (Okupe, 2015). In 2015, the
government of Nigeria took a decisive step towards improving the military’s efficiency in
combating the Boko Haram sect. Among the steps taken was the movement of Nigeria's
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military headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri, followed by increased funding for its
operations and the appointment of a new leadership in the military.
Further steps were taken by seeking assistance from the country’s neighbors, who
were equally affected by Boko Haram’s upsurge. Since 2015, Niger, Cameroon and Chad
have collaborated with Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram by deploying thousands of
their troops. This combined effort has been somewhat successful in combating the
insurgent group as it has reduced the level of violence since 2015.
Burt (2014) notes that “security partners beyond Africa have also come to
Nigeria’s aid. Following the abductions in Chibok (Nigeria), France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States pledged additional assistance, including equipment and
intelligence support.” According to News24, (2015), “in late January 2015, a coalition of
military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a counter-insurgency
campaign against the Boko Haram. On 4th February, the Chad Army killed over 200
Boko Haram militants.”
Thereafter, on 7 March 2015, “Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged
allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) via an audio message posted
on the organization’s Twitter account” (Army Times, 2016). Sami Kukasheka, the Nigerian
army spokesperson, had said that “the pledge was a sign of weakness and that Shekau was
like a drowning man” (Army Times, 2016). According to BBC News Africa (2016), ‘that
same day, five suicide bomb blasts left 54 dead and 143 wounded.” Asharq al-Awsat
(2016) and BBC News (2016) further stated that “in the same year 2016, President
Muhammadu Buhari declared that Boko Haram had been ousted from their last stronghold
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in the Sambisa Forest, effectively reducing Boko Haram to an insurgent force.” According
to Al Jazeera (2017),
“In March 2017, the Nigerian Department of State Services
(DSS) announced that ‘a suspected member of Boko Haram
had been arrested in northeastern Yobe State. The suspect
confessed details of a plot to attack the American and British
embassies, and other western targets in Abuja. The DSS also
later announced that between 25 and 26 March 2017, five
suspected members of Boko Haram had been arrested, thus
thwarting the plot” (Al Jazeera, 2017:19).
Al Jazeera (2017) further noted that “in April of the same year, the Nigerian military
began what it said was its ‘final offensive’ to retake Boko Haram's last strongholds. It
further reported that it had arrested about 126 suspected Boko Haram terrorists at the
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camp in Damboa, Borno State.” However, realities on
the ground have continued to show that the insurgent group is far from being defeated.
They continue to carry out wanton destruction of lives and properties in the northern part
of the country.
Moreover, the Nigerian government authorized neighboring countries like Chad,
Cameroon, Niger to deploy troops in Nigeria. Conversely, the Nigerian military could also
“operate beyond borders to hunt fleeing terrorists, thus removing their safe haven” (Okupe,
2015). Furthermore, “a state of emergency was declared in the three most affected northern
states, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe” (Akande, 2013:32). The government also
encouraged intelligence gathering by both the public and media to support its
counterinsurgency efforts.
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Support from the International Community
There has also been some international support against Boko Haram through
military aid to the Government of Nigeria in the form of funds, arms, ammunition,
intelligence tactics, manpower, etc. (Akande, 2013). To encourage international support
for Nigeria, the president of France Mr. Hollande stated that “to fight Boko Haram is to
fight Daesh, and we can no longer single out terrorism, according to regions. It is the same
terrorism, inspired by the same ideology of death” (Wolfrom, 2015).
According to Muzan,
Counterterrorism strategies by the US government through
denying of weapons, and sanctuaries of rogue states,
building institutional structures, control of base and landing
pads of terrorists, etc., appear to be effective. Therefore,
effective use of resources (power, military, land reforms,
finance, external alliances and hierarchical structure of
organization) determines the countering success (Muzan,
2014:218).
The U.S. intelligence community is “monitoring the expanding scope and diversity
of facilitation networks, which include semi-legitimate travel experts, attorneys, and other
types of professionals, as well as corrupt officials, who provide support services to criminal
and terrorist groups” (Muzan, 2014:218). In addition, “repressive responses in form of
covert operations which are secretive operations that include several possible counter
terrorist measures, such as infiltration, disinformation, and cyber war. Nonviolent covert
programs require creative and imaginative methods that are adapted to each terrorist
environment” (Muzan, 2014).
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) “formally sought
the approval and backing of the African Union (AU) to create a multi-national force to
fight the Boko Haram insurgents during the 2015 AU Summit, which was approved” (BBC
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News, 2013). Ugwu (2015) noted that “the dangers posed by Boko Haram demand greater
attention in Africa and call for a well-formulated and practical counter-insurgency
operation informed by a well-coordinated and flexible inter-agency analysis.” This is
because “to turn the tide against Boko Haram would require a full-scale counterinsurgency
plan across Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon” (BBC News, 2013). Therefore, more effective
measures are required for effective counterinsurgency and sustainable national
development in Nigeria, and this requires maximum cooperative and collaborative efforts
by all and sundry.
The international community has also employed economic sanctions against states
and agencies that sponsor terrorism. “Sanctions can either selectively target specific
economic sectors or generally restrict trade. The purpose is to pressure state sponsors to
modify or end their support for terrorism” (Martin, 2010).

Challenges and Setbacks
Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram has been mixed. For example, a Presidential
Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution for Security Challenges in the North was
established in April 2013. The 26-member committee had Tanimu Turaki (Minister of
Special Duties) as Chairman. The Committee was tasked with convincing Boko Haram
members to hand in their weapons for a state pardon. In response to the committee, Boko
Haram leader Abubakar Shekau said in an audio statement: “Surprisingly, the Nigerian
government is talking about granting us amnesty. What wrong have we done? On the
contrary, it is we that should grant you pardon” (BBC, 2013).
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The government’s incoherent response to the threat of Boko Haram has been
heavily criticized by many. Undoubtedly, the killing of Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian
police radicalized the group (Zenn, 2013). Thompson also argues that the group’s activities
were benign before the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and marked a tipping point in the use
of lethal force in the years that followed (Thompson, 2012). From this perspective, it is
important that the government adopt policy changes to address the group’s grievances as a
driving force. This means that significant issues would be brought to the negotiating table,
which is critical in the quest for a sustainable solution.
Part of the challenge is the military response to security threats. According to
Agbiboa (2013), “the activities of the Nigerian military have been heavily criticized as a
heavy-handed response to Boko Haram with the fear that it may fuel radical recruitment.”
According to Amnesty International, “many civilians affected by the church bombing in
Kano in 2012 were quick to blame the security forces rather than Boko Haram and
described the Federal Government as a shared enemy” (Amnesty International, 2014).
According to De-Montclos (2015), “the military repression of the Boko Haram
uprising in July 2009, massacres, extra-judicial killings and arrests without trial have
widened the gap between local communities and the armed forces. The only sustainable
way to combat Boko Haram is to protect civilians.” These experiences can constitute a
major hindrance to a successful counterinsurgency since many of the aggrieved civilians
may become uncooperative with the state security agencies (Oarhe, 2013). Akande (2013),
reported that “the invasion of and killing in the Baga community in Borno state on Sunday,
April 21, 2013 by Nigerian soldiers, who in a single operation killed over 200 civilians
suspected to be members of Boko Haram in the aftermath of an attack” (Akande, 2013:31).
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The United States Institute for Peace Special Report (2012) is of the opinion that
the way the Nigerian State handled the Boko Haram group is responsible for their resorting
to violence. They concluded that “weakness in the institutions of politics and the security
services creates a political situation where such threats to stability are not dealt with until
violence is a certainty. Their only method of dealing with any threat against the state is
violence” (USIPS Report, 2012). Boko Haram was created under these circumstances.
Aliyu et al. (2015) also contended that “political, external forces and lack of counter
insurgency approach by the Nigerian government which are busy fighting the symptoms
and not the root causes have been identified as some of the major factors which has
contributed in worsening the situation in the north eastern part of Nigeria.”
Hence “Boko Haram metamorphosing from a Dawah to an arms-bearing sect was
in part the making of the Nigerian security forces which approach the situation as one of
law and order and thus responded as such, there was no attempt to see the issues raised by
the movement in a broader multifaceted prism as political, social and economic”
(Mohammed, 2014). Stevenson (2015), in a comparative study of Boko Haram, ISIS, and
Al-Shabaab, it is stated that these three groups emerged out of crisis within their respective
states. He explicitly stated that the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria could be traced to the
governance challenge in the Northeast, aggressive police response, and prison breaks.
Amnesty International reported in 2015 that the security operatives extra-judicially
executed over 1,200 people; arbitrarily arrest up to 20,000 people, especially young men,
and male youths; tortured hundreds of thousands; and about 7,000 people have died in
detention facilities on account of starvation, overcrowding, and refusal of medical care
(Amnesty International, 2015:4). The crises within the Nigerian security forces, including
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inadequate equipment, low morale, and corruption, has given Boko Haram an advantage
in the conflict. For example, Boko Haram insurgents raided prisons to set their detained
members free and invaded military armories to pillage weapons (Bappah, 2016). The
insurgents even overran the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
in Baya (Borno State) on January 5, 2015 (Akinola, 2015).
Besides poor intelligence, the Nigerian government does not have the institutional
capacity to secure the nation. For example, former President Olusegun Obasanjo blamed
the Jonathan administration for failure to act until after 72 hours that the Chibok schoolgirls
were kidnapped (Daily Post, February 6, 2016). On their part, the International Crisis
Group (2014) notes that.
Boko Haram attacks escalated in 2014 and 2015, raising
doubts about the government’s progress toward containing
the group. In particularly brazen operations, the group
claimed a bombing of an Abuja bus station that killed nearly
one hundred people on April 14, 2014, the same day it
abducted more than two hundred schoolgirls from the
northeastern town of Chibok (International Crisis Group,
2014:29).

Some have suggested the Nigerian government engage in dialogue with Boko
Haram, utilizing the tenets of the amnesty program that has had great success in
demilitarizing the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. However, the reality on the ground is
such that the ideological thrust of Boko Haram makes this impracticable. In April 2011,
the offer of amnesty by the elected governor of Borno State, Kashim Shettima, was
rebuffed, when the group released a statement on a local language radio station about
their stance; saying that "first we do not believe in the Nigerian constitution and second,
we do not believe in democracy but only in the laws of Allah" (Elkaim, 2013). However,
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the lack of clarity in Boko Haram’s structure and ideological stance has made it difficult
for the Nigerian government to arrive at a policy choice towards curbing the terrorist
group.
Even though the government of Nigeria has taken some cautious steps toward
combating the terror group by launching several attacks against the group, it appears that
more effort is required. And despite declarations by the Nigerian government to the
contrary, Boko Haram has continued to present a grave security threat to the integrity of
Nigeria. According to Alkali (2015), “Boko Haram has been portrayed as a transnational,
Islamist insurgency that was predetermined to be a particularly lethal group, a review of its
evolution demonstrates that the group’s trajectory is the result of interactions with the state
security apparatus and the regional opportunity structure for recruitment and weapons
procurement.” The consequence of this is that Boko Haram insurgency can only be
subdued through an active collaborative method that involves the countries concerned.
Albert (2015) notes that “with the existence of over 1,400 illegal routes into Nigeria, the
insurgents will continually confront and embarrass the Nigerian state and sooner than later,
the other three countries shall also be riddled with various insurgent activities, until when
the countries concerned will pragmatically and simultaneously engage Boko Haram both
militarily and diplomatically with the sole aim of neutralizing and possibly, annihilating
the insurgency” (Albert, 2015: 17). Thus, a counterinsurgency that is pragmatic and
tactical, with enough military capability, is required for Nigeria and neighboring countries
to successfully defeat the transnational insurgency of Boko Haram in the region.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Summary of Findings
This study explored the role of Islamic identity in the rise of Boko Haram militant
extremism in Northern Nigeria. The study’s objectives as stated in the background section
were: (1) To examine the influence of Islam in Northern Nigeria; (2) To identify the
ideology behind the emergence Boko Haram extremism in Northern Nigeria; (3) To
evaluate whether the responses by the Nigerian government have been effective in tackling
extremism in Nigeria; and (4) to suggest policies that can address extremism in Nigeria.
In the course of the study, the second chapter provided a theoretical and conceptual
review of the basic concepts applied in the study. The study also examined the emergence
of Islam and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, and the Islamic identity grievance that
propels the group’s numerous chaos in the region. It emphasized that Boko Haram is
triggered by frustrated desire to implement religious law in northern Nigeria. The study
outlined the Nigerian government and international response towards combating the group
and the significant challenges or setbacks that they have faced. Finally, the study examined
some possible steps towards a victorious fight against Boko Haram.

Conclusion
The continued attacks on lives and properties by the Boko Haram group in
Nigeria have battered the country’s external image and affected its socio-economic
situation and trade relations with neighboring countries. The counter-insurgency
measures have so far failed to produce a positive result. The following recommendations
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are suggested for possible future success in fighting against the Boko Haram militant
extremism.
There is a need for a comprehensive and strategic plan first to understand the crisis
more and then mitigate the sect’s operational capability. Religion, that is, Islamic
extremism due to misconception and misinterpretations has been identified as the
motivating factors that led to the emergence of the Boko Haram. Therefore, the government
should combat religious radicalism through enactment of laws that will check the activities
of religious fanatics, and a program of awareness should be created against religious
radicalism. Since, as I have argued, religious ideology is an important way that the
members of Boko Haram justify their activities, Muslim clerics and other religious leaders
in the North should facilitate interfaith dialogue and encourage pluralism. The Nigerian
government can also explore other options by providing a platform for dialogue with the
leadership of the Boko Haram sect. This can be done by allowing the group leaders prove
their influence in Northern Nigeria through democratic means in any of the specified
communities where they currently operate.
There is also an urgent need for the Nigerian government to improve the
professionalism and competence of members of the state security agencies. The habit of
embezzlement of funds meant for security by some unscrupulous elements within the
Nigeria security agencies, notably the Nigerian Army, should be seriously checked and
dealt with. International cooperation is also needed, because Nigeria cannot do it alone.
According to the International Crisis Group (2014), “concerning the virtually
insurmountable task ahead, the Nigerian government will need international assistance –
in the areas of counterinsurgency operations, detection of improvised explosive devices,
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forensic analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis.” Thus, the Nigerian government
should intensify efforts at strengthening its collaboration and cooperation with neighboring
countries in order to put up a strong force towards combating the Boko Haram and other
terrorist sects in the country and West African region.
In view of this, there should be better coordination and intelligence sharing between
the Nigerian army and those of the neighboring countries through the Multinational Joint
Task Force (MNJTF) and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Also, there should be
effective border management or control with other neighboring countries in the Lake Chad
Basin to address border crimes such as illicit arms proliferation, terrorism, and kidnapping.
Also, there is need to develop “intelligence-led” anti-terrorism capacity based on
stronger synergy between the intelligence bodies in the country and intelligence agencies
in neighboring countries (Alimeka, 2012: 4), strengthening of regional cooperation and
capacity of neighboring countries based on the realization that terrorism and other security
threats also exploit Nigeria’s porous borders and the limited capacities of neighboring
countries to its advantage.
The Nigerian Government should prioritize specialized intelligence training for
men of the Nigerian Army (NA), Nigeria Police Force (NPF), State Security Service
(SSS), and the National Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), in scientific methods
of anti-terrorism war as this is what is obtainable in most advanced nations. Moreover, the
government should encourage for research and intelligence development in order to
produce intellectually grounded and professionally sound intelligence practitioners.
Security and intelligence education need be mainstreamed at all levels of educational
development process. Moreover, the budgetary allocation to security and the various
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intelligence agencies must be reasonable and adequate in order to have access to modern
equipment, information gathering and application as data is key in security.
Going forward, the Nigerian government should be proactive and responsive in
matters of security; to solve the issue before it explodes. It has been identified that the slow
response from the Nigerian government led to the escalation of the insurgency. The
government should be more professional in handling security matters to avoid a situation
where suspects are killed extra-judicially.
Finally, there is a need for Nigeria's government to ensure the provision of good
governance by making the government’s presence felt in Northeastern Nigeria by breaking
the poverty cycle of inadequate education, and socio-inequalities in the area. The
government should invest in public services in vocational training, skills acquisition,
educational opportunities, employment generation and health facilities. This will help
lessen the appeal of this destructive ideology for the youth and future generations of
northern Nigeria’s Muslim communities.
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